Attorney Ron Kleiner, on FAC’s Attorney Referral page, has successfully argued something similar in court— that you can’t change the goalposts on removal.

As the law changes, how is it not retroactive that folks that accepted terms like 20 year term to apply for removal, but now must wait 25 years.

When the law was written, it stated that 20 year started at date of conviction if not incarcerated. It now states 20 year starts at completion of sentence whether it be probation or prison?

Sorna had not been passed but folks must accept moving to goal post or changing the rules at halftime.

This will get the state’s attention if all of us start filing on this because it’s the truth there is mental anguish stress and suffering going on if you can file on it when you’re injured why not file this the same way when you have been convicted of this crime it is called similar facts here also slavery was abolished in 1865 so that means we are slaves of the state while we’re on the registry so slavery was abolished that qualifies it as a federal class B action lawsuit thank you for for listening

Florida needs a requirement that legislators do no harm to their communities, state, and are smarter than a 1st grader.

What’s a day

You know what, I think I am going back to work. I will work for ten minutes and tell my boss, “Hey, according to the law, a day is considered “Any part of a day, so as far as I am concerned, I gave you my day, now pay me”.

FDLE has issued no guidance to registration offices. Nevertheless, any definition will become moot if the legislature re-defines it in law. Then a day (for purposes of residence registration) will become whatever the legislature says it is.

Thank you, JZ. I will send this info to the Senate Criminal Justice Committee where the bill is now sitting. As a member of this committee, Hooper will be receiving the info, too.

FDLE filed a motion to dismiss to our Does v Swearingen complaint in November of 2018

Starting at bottom of Page 11:

“1. The Meaning of “Day”
Plaintiffs’ first vagueness challenges alleges it is unclear whether the word “day” within §775.21(1)(n) and § 943.0435(1)(f) means a “full 24-hour day or a specific date.” (D.E. 1 at ¶ 38.)

They ask whether a hotel arrival at 11:50 p.m. on May 1 would mean that May 1 is the first day, or that the first day ends 24 hours after the arrival. (Id.) This hypothetical shows that Plaintiffs are not actually raising any question as to the meaning of the word “day,” but as to how Florida law generally computes the time in which an action must be done. That computational question is not governed by the word “day,” or by § 943.0435 at all.

In any event, a statute’s words are not vague if they can be ascertained through “judicial decisions, common laws, dictionaries, and the words themselves because they possess a common and
generally accepted meaning.” United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 944 (11 th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 381 (6 th Cir. 2004)); United States v. Panfil, 338 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11 th Cir. 2003) (statutory terms not vague where they have “plain and ordinary meanings”).

Despite Plaintiffs’ allegation that the word “day” is vague, a “day” has a common and generally accepted meaning. “The general rule is that when the word ‘day’ is used it means calendar day which includes the entire day from midnight to midnight.” State v. Sheets, 338 N.W. 2d 886, 887 (Iowa1983). See also Burgo v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 122 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 1997) (“A day is the period of time during which the earth makes on revolution on its axis, the average length of this interval being 24 hours.”) (citing Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 294 (10 th ed. 1997)); S. Tr. Ins. Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Summerville, 310 S.E. 2d 712, 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (when not qualified, the word “day” means calendar day “consisting of 24 hours from midnight to midnight”).

A day is an indivisible unit; the law does not recognize fractions of a day. Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. 191, 198 (1872); Maxwell v. Jacksonville Loan & Imp. Co., 34 So. 255, 264 (Fla. 1903).

A court must presume the Legislature knows the plain and ordinary meaning of the words it uses in statutes. Brooks v. Anastasia Mosquito Control Dist., 148 So. 2d 64, 66 (Fla. 1963). See also United States v. Forest Hills Garden E. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (courts presume “the Legislature ‘said what it meant and meant what it said’”) (quoting Rine v. Imagitas, Inc., 590 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11 th Cir. 2009)).

If the Legislature wanted to couch a temporary residence in terms of 24-hour blocks and not calendar days, it would have done so—as it did in numerous other parts of the statute. For example, § 943.0435(2)(a)1, (b)3 and (4)(a) all require reporting “within 48 hours,” while
§ 943.0435(b)2 uses both hours and days (“within 48 hours,” “every 30 days”).”

Apparently, Legislator Hooper doesn’t know the plain and ordinary meaning of the words he uses in SB 1932.

CherokeeJack

I don’t want them working at the power plant my lights would be out all the time just like theirs. Maybe they can be your security guards.