https://narsol.org/2021/01/seventh-circuit-orders-names-of-six-indiana-registrants-removed-from-registry/

Re-scratch Indiana from my exodus plan.

A perhaps more suitable case showing a competing outcome is Doe v. Jindal (E.E. La. 2015): https://mitchellhamline.edu/sex-offense-litigation-policy/wp-content/uploads/sites/61/2019/04/Trial-Court-Opinion-1.pdf

In this suit, the Court took the exact opposite position on Saenz v. Roe’s application here. What I find interesting is the Opinion says out-of-state offenders are never similarly situated because the offenses happened in different states. And yet somehow the state claims that same offense is similar to whatever offense in its list and compels registration. So it’s not the same when the offender sues, but it is the same when the state wants to throw a smackdown? uhhh….not ok.

The case you cite isn’t wholly settled. What the WASC said is that it’s not an unconstitutional delegation to AZ. It then remanded the case back to the lower court to consider the further claims of, “ex post facto, double jeopardy, and equal protection,” violations. It’s the last one, equal protection, that this IN case addresses. This WA case may end up falling the same way as the IN case. The plaintiff should certainly raise the claim that he’s being treated differently than a native, non-traveling, citizen would be. That is the crux of the case(

From my reading of this case, it shouldn’t matter what the previous state imposes. From my understanding, IN must assess you based on if your crime had happened in IN. Note that there is a dividing line for offenders before and after the 2006 SORA amendment in IN, so if convicted after that date, you may not have the same protections. That said, if your FL crime only requires 15 years in IN and you’re 16 years down the road, IN should be prohibited from forcing you to register. As the Opinion says, “[t]he other jurisdiction requirement of Indiana’s SORA imposes a duty to register and its attendant burdens upon a relocating citizen that it would not impose upon a lifelong Indiana resident. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits this differential treatment.”

I fully agree, RM. In fact, I have long stated that the “other jurisdiction” parts of SORAs violate the 14th/Freedom of Travel Clause. The specific instance of which I’m aware (though not subject to) is in Minnesota. Minnesota uses the greater of its terms or the terms of the state from whence the migrant came. That is 100% discriminating between natives and migrants, not to mention against those migrants. Though only persuasive outside the 7th’s turf (IN, IL, WI), I foresee this case as a solid arrow in the quiver for challenging these types of provisions everywhere.

A twist on this type of deal is the state where I live only counts the time while a resident of the State towards satisfying the number of years registered. In other words, the registration period starts from the time residency is established, NOT from when the crime took place. They also do not give “credit” if one leaves and comes back. Any time spent as a non-resident tolls the clock on registration. Blatantly unconstitutional, IMO.

To clarify, does this only benefit those with older pre SORA convictions?

Or does this provide any relief to those willing to relocate to Indiana but have more recent post SORA convictions?

Thanks for your prompt response. So when should we pack up and head for [Southern] Indiana?

http://iga.in.gov/legislative/laws/2020/ic/titles/011#11-8-8

I’m no lawyer, but I carefully read the opinion of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeal and their holding appears to invalidate this provision. This is the “other-jurisdiction” requirement that the Court struck down as a violation of the right to travel. The Court said that the State of Indiana must treat Indianans and citizens of other states who relocate to Indiana equally in terms of their registration obligations.