

February 9, 2017

Honorable Judge William H, Pryor, Acting Chair United States Sentencing Commission One Columbus Circle, N.E. Suite 2-500 Washington D.C. 20002-8002

Attn: Public Affairs

RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SECTION §4C1.1 (FIRST OFFENDERS) OF THE

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

Dear Judge Prior:

This letter serves as a public comment to the United States Sentencing Commission's proposed amendment regarding the addition of §4C1.1 (First Offenders).

The Florida Action Committee, Inc. ("FAC") is a not-for-profit, public safety advocacy organization with a membership base of over one thousand individuals. We support the Commission's efforts to provide relief to "first offenders" as defined and proposed in the December 19, 2016 edition of the Federal Register. (81 FR 92003 and 81 FR 92021). We also support the Commission's efforts to enforce the proposed relief as retroactive to those who qualify as a "first offender". We agree with the Commission's empirically based approach in determining that "first offenders" generally pose the lowest risk of recidivism.

In 2012, the Commission provided an exhaustive report to Congress entitled <u>Federal Child Pornography Offenses</u>. The Commission noted that its policy¹ for recommending the maximum term of supervised release for those convicted of sex offenses was made prior to the enactment of the 2003 PROTECT Act². The Commission recognized a need to amend this policy "in a manner that provides guidance to judges to impose a term of supervised release within the statutory range of five years to a lifetime term that is tailored to an individual offender's risk and corresponding need for supervision³".

FAC encourages the Commission to revisit this initiative consistent with "first offenders" convicted of a non-production child pornography offense that have no history of sexual contact with children. In such cases, a policy statement recommending the imposition of the minimum mandatory term of 5 years of supervised release is appropriate. FAC suggests that this proposed policy change be made retroactive to those defendants who qualify.

¹U.S.S.G. §5D1.2(b).

²The PROTECT Act increased the supervised release term for those convicted of sex offenses to a statutory range of 5 years to life.

³http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/sex-offense-topics/201212- federal-child-pornography-offenses/Full Report to Congress.pdf at page xix.

FAC also requests that the Commission exclude 18 U.S.C.§ 2252(a) from the "crime of violence" definition under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2. The United States Supreme Court defines "crime of violence" within the United States Code as violent force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person. See, *Leocal v. Ashcroft*, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) (interpreting "crime of violence" definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16); *Johnson v. United States*, 130 S.Ct. 1265, **1271** (2010) (interpreting "crime of violence" definition in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)).

Contrary to these decisions, 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(C) includes any felony under chapter 110 as a "crime of violence" even though the required elements of violent physical force are not present within the plain statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a). To further complicate matters, the Commission's definition of "crime of violence" provides enumerated offenses which includes "forcible sex offenses". In 2016, the Commission amended the definition of "forcible sex offense" as an offense with an element where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced. The Commission commented that this definition is consistent with U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, and that certain forcible sex offenses which do not expressly include as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another should nevertheless constitute "crimes of violence" under §4B1.2.⁴ However, for the purposes of U.S.S.G. §2L1.2(b)(1), the terms "child pornography offense" and "crime of violence" are separately and exclusively defined. See, Commentary Application Note 1(B)(ii),(iii). This suggests that a violation under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) is neither a "forcible sex offense" nor a "crime of violence".

To avoid the inconsistencies within the United States Code and the United States Sentencing Guidelines, we request that the Sentencing Commission consider amending its §4B1.2 commentary to specifically exclude 18 U.S.C. 2252(a) from the "crime of violence" definition, as this change is appropriate and consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions.

FAC expresses gratitude to the United States Sentencing Commission for the opportunity to provide public comment to its proposed amendments, and for the Commission's dedication to create and change its policies in a manner that reflects a careful analysis of law, empirical data, and public commentary.

Kind regards,

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⁴http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/20160121 RF.pdf at page 4.