The plaintiff, Lane Kirkpatrick, argued that forcing him to carry and present a driver’s license branded with “SEXUAL PREDATOR” violates the First Amendment by compelling him to communicate the government’s message every time he shows his ID. The State argued that he didn’t even have standing to bring the lawsuit. The court disagreed.

In fact, the judge found that Mr. Kirkpatrick did have standing, recognizing that he had presented evidence of real injuries, including a canceled hotel reservation, lost work opportunities, additional TSA screening, and the stigma he experiences whenever he has to present his license. The court also acknowledged that even a temporary violation of First Amendment rights is itself a cognizable injury.

So why did he lose? Not because the court decided the branding is constitutional. He lost because of the statute of limitations.

The court concluded that Mr. Kirkpatrick’s claim accrued when he first received a driver’s license bearing the “SEXUAL PREDATOR” designation in 2015. Because he didn’t file suit until 2023, the court held that his claim was filed too late under Florida’s four-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions.

In fact, the judge closed the opinion by stating: “The Court makes no prediction as to the outcome of a challenge presented by a different plaintiff.” That is an important statement.

For those wondering what comes next, the opinion may actually point the way forward. FAC has spoken with an attorney for the Florida Justice Institute (who represented the Plaintiff). They are disappointed by the decision here, but not throwing in the towel by any means. If you are a person who was first issued a Florida driver’s license bearing the “SEXUAL PREDATOR” designation within the past four years, you would no have the same statute-of-limitations problem that prevented Mr. Kirkpatrick’s case from going forward. In other words, someone in that position could be a strong candidate to bring the very same constitutional challenge.

If that describes you and you are interested in pursuing such a case, please reach out to FAC. While we cannot provide legal advice or representation, we would like to hear from individuals who may be in a position to challenge this law before their limitations period expires and potentially make the introduction.

You can read the decision here: Kirkpatrick – Drivers License Case

The post A Mixed Bag: Challenge to Florida’s “SEXUAL PREDATOR” Driver License Branding Dismissed—But Not on the Merits appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

James Ellis Jr. pleaded guilty to attempted rape in Illinois in 1983 and served his sentence — six months in jail, two years of probation. He was never required to register anywhere, because the offense predated Michigan’s registry entirely. Nearly 40 years later, in 2021, Ellis — now in his 60s — stole an $18 ribeye steak from a Walmart in Niles, Michigan, and shoved an employee who confronted him. He pleaded guilty to attempted unarmed robbery and got one to five years. As part of that sentence, the trial court also slapped him with lifetime Tier III sex offender registration — not because of the robbery, but because of the 1983 case, resurrected by MCL 28.723(1)(e), the “recapture” provision.

The Court ruled that using SORA registration as a penalty for a nonsexual crime is cruel or unusual punishment under Michigan’s constitution. Applying the four-factor test from People v Lorentzen, the Court found:

The penalty was grossly disproportionate to the offense — registering someone as a sex offender for stealing a steak, when they haven’t committed a sexual offense in 30-plus years, “exceeded any punishment that would be suitable to fit” the actual crime.

Michigan is one of only three states in the country with a recapture provision like this — the overwhelming majority of states don’t do this at all. It does nothing for rehabilitation. As the Court put it, branding someone a sex offender for conduct that had nothing to do with sex “frustrates a defendant’s ability to address the root causes of their nonsexual criminality and reintegrate into society.”

The case is remanded to the trial court to strike the registration requirement from Ellis’s sentence.

The post MI Supreme Court: SORA’s “Recapture” Provision Is Unconstitutional for Nonsexual Offenses appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

We invite you to listen and share your opinion on how it went.

Click to Listen – 1
Click to Listen – 2

The post Listen: Oral Arguments in 6th Circuit Sex Offender Arguments appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

We are seeking individuals who are directly impacted by Florida’s recent amendments and who are willing to submit a declaration describing how these new restrictions affect their lives. Real stories from real people help the court understand the practical consequences of these laws.

Examples of situations that may qualify include:

• “I visit my elderly mother several times each year. Because I visit more than three days in a calendar year, I am required to register her address as a temporary residence. Since she lives in a community with a pool, I can no longer visit her.”
• “The lease on my apartment expires this year, and my family planned to move from a one-bedroom apartment to a two-bedroom apartment within the same community. Because the community has a pool, we can no longer relocate—even within the same complex.”
• “I work in a shopping mall and interact with dozens of people every day. I cannot always determine whether a customer is 17 or 19 years old, so I do not know whether I can legally communicate with them. I asked my supervising officer whether the mall is considered a ‘place where children congregate,’ and he did not know.”

These are only examples. The strongest declarations are those that describe your actual circumstances, explain how the new law affects you, and identify the uncertainty, hardship, or impossible choices it has created.

If you are willing to help, please submit your situation to legal@floridaactioncommittee.org no later than Friday, July 24. We will help you format it into the form of a declaration. All you need to do is write a few paragraphs, in your own words, describing your own situation.

Your voice could make a meaningful difference in challenging these unconstitutional restrictions.

The post Deadline to Submit a Declaration: Friday, July 24 appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

Earlier this year, the brave named registrants and their attorney, Janice Bellucci from ACSOL, successfully challenged a law that required they post a “no candy or treats” sign at their house on Halloween. Now the State wants the Supreme Court to review the Appellate Court’s decision. Here’s why we’re not particularly concerned.

Each Term, the Supreme Court of the United States receives approximately 7,000 to 8,000 petitions for writs of certiorari, yet grants and hears oral argument in only about 60 to 70 cases. That means fewer than 1% of all petitions are accepted for full review. The overwhelming majority of petitions are denied without any comment on the merits.

Is this Halloween sign such a matter of national significance that it’s worthy of the court’s attention, especially in light of the social science showing that there’s no increase in instances of sexual offending on Halloween?!? We think not. We also believe that if, defying the odds, the Court does decide to take it up, the issue is strong enough that the registrants will prevail anyhow.

So if Missouri wants to dig in their heels and fight a nonsensical, useless, Halloween sign ordinance to the Supreme Court, we say good luck with that!

You can read Missouri’s petition for Writ of Certiorari here: Sanderson Halloween Certiorari

The post Missouri asks SCOTUS to review Halloween sign decision appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

Here’s the background for those who don’t follow our site: Bruce Henry was convicted in federal court of possessing child pornography in 2013. After serving his prison sentence and completing treatment, he married and later had a son. Alabama law permanently prohibited him from living with his own child simply because his conviction qualified as a “sex offense involving a child.” There was no hearing, no individualized risk assessment, and no mechanism for relief.

Henry challenged the law, arguing that it violated his fundamental right as a parent. The Trial Court agreed, the original 3-Justice panel of the 11th Circuit agreed. But then, without any apparent request, the entire panel of the 11th Circuit decided to rehear the case of it’s own volition, which raised a lot of anxiety among all registrant parents in the 11th Circuit (which includes Florida). If the court said it’s ok for Alabama to create a law that says a registrant can’t live with their own children, certainly Florida (and possibly Georgia) would follow suit.

The case was heard and it took a while for the 90+ page opinion to come out, but at the end of the day, all that matters is that the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with one critical point: Parents on the registry do not lose their constitutional status as parents simply because they have a qualifying conviction.

The court repeatedly emphasized that the right of parents to live with their children is one of the oldest and most fundamental liberty interests protected by the Constitution. The court rejected Alabama’s argument that people convicted of certain sex offenses simply do not possess the fundamental right to live with their children. Instead, the court held that all parents possess this constitutional right. Registrants are not excluded from that protection simply because of their conviction.

If the government wants to interfere with that right, it must satisfy strict scrutiny, the highest level of constitutional review. That is a monumental shift. Previously, Alabama argued that registrants never possessed the right in the first place. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that premise outright.

Another important outcome is that the opinion repeatedly criticizes Alabama’s use of an “irrebuttable presumption”. Essentially an irrebuttable presumption assumes a fact is always true and does not allow the affected person any opportunity to prove otherwise. In simple terms, the government has already made up its mind, and no amount of evidence can change the outcome. “All persons required to register can’t…” “Every person on the registry is prohibited from …” without any exception, petition process, appeal, etc. (See where this is going – and where it can potentially help in other cases?).

The court explained that American history has never supported automatically stripping parents of custody or cohabitation rights based solely on past misconduct. Historically, courts made individualized determinations focused on the child’s present welfare—not permanent categorical bans. That reasoning could become extremely important in future registry litigation.

For FAC members (and all registrants in the 11th Circuit) who have children, this decision is extremely encouraging. It establishes several principles that future courts will have difficulty ignoring. First, being on a registry does not eliminate constitutional rights. Second, the government cannot simply label someone a sex offender and by virtue of that label declare they have no protected liberty interests. And third, Courts must treat parental rights of registrants with the same constitutional seriousness afforded to every other parent (in other words, “registered sex offenders” can’t be treated as a separate class of persons).

All that said, the court did not invalidate Alabama’s statute. Instead, it sent the case back so the lower court can determine whether Alabama’s law can actually survive strict scrutiny (a much harder test). The court acknowledged that protecting children is unquestionably a compelling government interest, but explained that the Constitution requires more than a blanket lifetime prohibition — it requires determining whether the law is narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.

From FAC’s perspective, this is an important constitutional milestone. For decades, legislatures have often enacted registry laws based on categorical assumptions — that everyone on the registry presents the same level of risk and should therefore be subject to the same restrictions. The Eleventh Circuit just rejected that approach in the context of one fundamental right. We now have a case to cite when it comes to other fundamental rights.

The opinion can be read here: Bruce Henry En Banc Opinion

The post Big Win in the 11th Circuit! En Banc Decision in Henry Came Out Today. appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

For those following registry reform litigation, the most important development may have been the Court’s willingness to look beyond legislative labels and examine the real-world effects of laws and sanctions. That theme appeared repeatedly throughout the term and could eventually influence how courts evaluate modern sex offender registration schemes. The most significant case for registry reform advocates was undoubtedly Ellingburg v. United States. It represents a turning point for registry challenges, where courts have relied on old-generation registry schemes to pile on the “not-punishments”. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court rejected arguments that restitution should be treated as merely remedial or civil (because that’s how they are labeled) and instead focused on its punitive nature.

For decades, courts have relied on Smith v. Doe to uphold retroactive sex offender registration laws by characterizing them as “civil” rather than punitive. Ellingburg suggests courts should look beyond labels and examine whether a consequence functions as punishment in reality. Justice Thomas’s concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, has generated particular interest because it reflects a broader historical approach to determining what constitutes punishment. Although Ellingburg did not overrule Smith v. Doe (even though it called out that case critically several times), it has already sparked strategy among attorneys and advocates about whether modern registration schemes—many of which now include extensive reporting requirements, residency restrictions, internet restrictions, travel restrictions, and public dissemination — remain meaningfully distinguishable from punishment. A huge, huge, huge case for us!

Another significant decision came in Chatrie v. United States, involving so-called “geofence warrants.” In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in cellphone location data and that law enforcement’s acquisition of broad geofence data constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. The Court rejected the argument that people lose privacy protections merely because a third-party technology company collects their location information. The Court did not completely prohibit geofence warrants (in the event there is suspicion of a crime), but it made clear that constitutional protections apply and that digital location tracking requires meaningful Fourth Amendment scrutiny. In other words, a police officer has to have probable cause that a crime is being committed and can’t just do a fishing expedition (think Highlands County) and merely look and see what they can catch. The case was sent back to lower courts for further proceedings. For registrants, the implications are obvious because of ambiguous proximity ordinances. Did you unknowingly cross the invisible line stepping within 499 feet of a “place where children congregate”? Chatrie reinforces the principle that technological convenience does not eliminate constitutional privacy protections.

There were a couple of indirectly impacting cases that are worth mentioning. In Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton the Court upheld Texas’s online age-verification law for adult-content websites. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion signaled a willingness to allow government regulation of sexual content and age-verification requirements that burden privacy and anonymous access. The Court demonstrated less concern for anonymity and privacy interests when sexual content and child-protection rationales are involved. Think about all the “stings” where people allegedly seek out minors on adult dating sites… The case (and loosening privacy rights in general) is something FAC would never be pleased with, but looking at it from another perspective and all the online platforms registrants can’t be on, there’s suddenly the argument, “why can’t we go on XYZ? we can’t possibly be trolling for minors on there because every user has to verify they are an adult…” This is not so much for future registry litigation, but more so an argument to reenter the digital world.

There was also Esteras v. United States, where the Court held that judges revoking supervised release cannot rely on retribution or punishment considerations; they must focus on the purposes Congress authorized. This only matters if you’re under federal supervised release and can provide arguments against revocation decisions that appear primarily punitive rather than tied to supervision goals of rehabilitation.

So even though no registry case reached the Supreme Court this term, we did get a very strong holding that courts should examine whether a consequence is actually punitive rather than simply accepting legislative labels (Ellingburg). This will revive Ex Post Facto arguments in future litigation. And we don’t have to worry about bored, vindictive or under-quota Sheriff’s detectives arbitrarily getting your cellphone coordinates to see if you stepped within 499 feet of a Chuck E Cheeses. (Chatrie).

Truth be told, the US Supreme Court has not taken on an actual registry challenge in a long, long time, so it’s ripe. They’ve addressed individual elements of registration (Packingham) or the Non-Delegation Doctrine (Gundy) in recent years, but not a full-fledged registration challenge where the court has an opportunity to overturn Smith v. Doe. The closest we came most recently was Does v. Snyder (where the Sixth Circuit held Michigan’s registry had become so punitive that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case, leaving the victory intact, but by refusing to hear it it didn’t overturn Smith v. Doe and become the law of the land. We are hoping that the case we’re working on now will be the vehicle to get us there!

The post The Supreme Court’s 2025–26 Term Has Ended: What Does It Mean for Registry Reform? appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

The plaintiffs argue that forcing them to display this label every time they present identification (whether at a pharmacy, doctor’s office, airport, bank, or workplace) violates the First Amendment by compelling them to convey a government message they do not wish to express. It also subjects them and their families to stigma, distrust, revulsion, poor treatment.

The State attempted to have the case thrown out before it could move forward. The court rejected those arguments, holding that the proper state official can be sued, that the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation, and that the case may proceed. The court also refused to strike the proposed class action allegations, leaving open the possibility that thousands of affected Oklahomans could ultimately benefit from the lawsuit. Importantly, the judge recognized the real-world impact of these branded licenses and accepted as true the plaintiffs’ allegations that the label subjects them to fear, stigma, humiliation, and potential harm whenever they must show identification.

This ruling does not decide whether the law is unconstitutional. But it is an important first step. The case is allowed to proceed, and the plaintiffs will now have the opportunity to prove their case.

Progress is rarely immediate. It happens one case, one ruling, and one courageous plaintiff at a time. This decision is a hopeful reminder that meaningful change remains possible and that the fight for fairness, justice, and equal treatment under the law continues to move forward.

OK Doc 48 Opinion and Order Denying MTD

The post OK: Win in Branded License Case. NARSOL Lawsuit survives Motion to Dismiss. appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

During the proceedings, the State acknowledges that employment changes must be reported in person at the sheriff’s office. Under the State’s theory, a registrant in Smith’s position would need to report to work, learn where the company was sending him that day, somehow leave the work assignment, travel to the sheriff’s office to register that temporary job location, and then return to work—all before performing a single hour of labor. They even suggest the work bus drive him to the Sheriff’s office. Like that’s going to happen!

Cases like this force courts to confront an important question: At what point does a registration requirement become an impossible obstacle to ordinary employment?

We are curious to hear how you think Oral Argument went. You can watch it from this link: https://ohiochannel.org/programs/supreme-court-of-ohio-case-no-2025-1215-state-v-smith

The post OH: Watch Ohio Supreme Court Arguments in State v. Smith appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

The case involves a registrant who worked for a cleaning company and was assigned to various job sites as part of his employment. Although he reported his employer, prosecutors argued that a temporary work location constituted a separate “place of employment” that he was required to register. When he failed to do so, he was charged with a felony. The registrant argues that Ohio’s law is unconstitutional because it never clearly defines what a “place of employment” is, leaving people to guess whether the term refers to an employer’s headquarters, a temporary job site, a customer’s property, or somewhere else entirely.

The issues before the Ohio Supreme Court are particularly relevant in Florida, where lawmakers recently expanded employment-reporting requirements under the state’s registry law. While employment reporting may sound straightforward on paper, the reality is far different for many registrants. Because employment opportunities are often limited, many work in industries that involve traveling from location to location throughout the day. They mow lawns, work on construction sites, clean commercial properties, perform maintenance work, flag traffic for road crews, and take other labor-intensive jobs that require them to move between multiple locations.

That raises obvious questions. If a landscaper services ten properties in a single day, is each property a reportable employment location? If a construction worker spends a week at one job site and then moves to another, must the registration be updated every time? If a janitorial employee cleans several businesses each week, are all of those locations considered places of employment? If the answer is yes, compliance quickly becomes an overwhelming burden for people who are simply trying to maintain lawful employment and support themselves.

FAC will be closely following this case.

A copy of the Appellant’s Brief is below:
OH – Employment

The post OH: What Is a “Place of Employment”? Ohio Supreme Court to Hear Major Registry Due Process Case on June 9 appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).