Earlier this year, the brave named registrants and their attorney, Janice Bellucci from ACSOL, successfully challenged a law that required they post a “no candy or treats” sign at their house on Halloween. Now the State wants the Supreme Court to review the Appellate Court’s decision. Here’s why we’re not particularly concerned.

Each Term, the Supreme Court of the United States receives approximately 7,000 to 8,000 petitions for writs of certiorari, yet grants and hears oral argument in only about 60 to 70 cases. That means fewer than 1% of all petitions are accepted for full review. The overwhelming majority of petitions are denied without any comment on the merits.

Is this Halloween sign such a matter of national significance that it’s worthy of the court’s attention, especially in light of the social science showing that there’s no increase in instances of sexual offending on Halloween?!? We think not. We also believe that if, defying the odds, the Court does decide to take it up, the issue is strong enough that the registrants will prevail anyhow.

So if Missouri wants to dig in their heels and fight a nonsensical, useless, Halloween sign ordinance to the Supreme Court, we say good luck with that!

You can read Missouri’s petition for Writ of Certiorari here: Sanderson Halloween Certiorari

The post Missouri asks SCOTUS to review Halloween sign decision appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

Here’s the background for those who don’t follow our site: Bruce Henry was convicted in federal court of possessing child pornography in 2013. After serving his prison sentence and completing treatment, he married and later had a son. Alabama law permanently prohibited him from living with his own child simply because his conviction qualified as a “sex offense involving a child.” There was no hearing, no individualized risk assessment, and no mechanism for relief.

Henry challenged the law, arguing that it violated his fundamental right as a parent. The Trial Court agreed, the original 3-Justice panel of the 11th Circuit agreed. But then, without any apparent request, the entire panel of the 11th Circuit decided to rehear the case of it’s own volition, which raised a lot of anxiety among all registrant parents in the 11th Circuit (which includes Florida). If the court said it’s ok for Alabama to create a law that says a registrant can’t live with their own children, certainly Florida (and possibly Georgia) would follow suit.

The case was heard and it took a while for the 90+ page opinion to come out, but at the end of the day, all that matters is that the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with one critical point: Parents on the registry do not lose their constitutional status as parents simply because they have a qualifying conviction.

The court repeatedly emphasized that the right of parents to live with their children is one of the oldest and most fundamental liberty interests protected by the Constitution. The court rejected Alabama’s argument that people convicted of certain sex offenses simply do not possess the fundamental right to live with their children. Instead, the court held that all parents possess this constitutional right. Registrants are not excluded from that protection simply because of their conviction.

If the government wants to interfere with that right, it must satisfy strict scrutiny, the highest level of constitutional review. That is a monumental shift. Previously, Alabama argued that registrants never possessed the right in the first place. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that premise outright.

Another important outcome is that the opinion repeatedly criticizes Alabama’s use of an “irrebuttable presumption”. Essentially an irrebuttable presumption assumes a fact is always true and does not allow the affected person any opportunity to prove otherwise. In simple terms, the government has already made up its mind, and no amount of evidence can change the outcome. “All persons required to register can’t…” “Every person on the registry is prohibited from …” without any exception, petition process, appeal, etc. (See where this is going – and where it can potentially help in other cases?).

The court explained that American history has never supported automatically stripping parents of custody or cohabitation rights based solely on past misconduct. Historically, courts made individualized determinations focused on the child’s present welfare—not permanent categorical bans. That reasoning could become extremely important in future registry litigation.

For FAC members (and all registrants in the 11th Circuit) who have children, this decision is extremely encouraging. It establishes several principles that future courts will have difficulty ignoring. First, being on a registry does not eliminate constitutional rights. Second, the government cannot simply label someone a sex offender and by virtue of that label declare they have no protected liberty interests. And third, Courts must treat parental rights of registrants with the same constitutional seriousness afforded to every other parent (in other words, “registered sex offenders” can’t be treated as a separate class of persons).

All that said, the court did not invalidate Alabama’s statute. Instead, it sent the case back so the lower court can determine whether Alabama’s law can actually survive strict scrutiny (a much harder test). The court acknowledged that protecting children is unquestionably a compelling government interest, but explained that the Constitution requires more than a blanket lifetime prohibition — it requires determining whether the law is narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.

From FAC’s perspective, this is an important constitutional milestone. For decades, legislatures have often enacted registry laws based on categorical assumptions — that everyone on the registry presents the same level of risk and should therefore be subject to the same restrictions. The Eleventh Circuit just rejected that approach in the context of one fundamental right. We now have a case to cite when it comes to other fundamental rights.

The opinion can be read here: Bruce Henry En Banc Opinion

The post Big Win in the 11th Circuit! En Banc Decision in Henry Came Out Today. appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

For those following registry reform litigation, the most important development may have been the Court’s willingness to look beyond legislative labels and examine the real-world effects of laws and sanctions. That theme appeared repeatedly throughout the term and could eventually influence how courts evaluate modern sex offender registration schemes. The most significant case for registry reform advocates was undoubtedly Ellingburg v. United States. It represents a turning point for registry challenges, where courts have relied on old-generation registry schemes to pile on the “not-punishments”. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court rejected arguments that restitution should be treated as merely remedial or civil (because that’s how they are labeled) and instead focused on its punitive nature.

For decades, courts have relied on Smith v. Doe to uphold retroactive sex offender registration laws by characterizing them as “civil” rather than punitive. Ellingburg suggests courts should look beyond labels and examine whether a consequence functions as punishment in reality. Justice Thomas’s concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, has generated particular interest because it reflects a broader historical approach to determining what constitutes punishment. Although Ellingburg did not overrule Smith v. Doe (even though it called out that case critically several times), it has already sparked strategy among attorneys and advocates about whether modern registration schemes—many of which now include extensive reporting requirements, residency restrictions, internet restrictions, travel restrictions, and public dissemination — remain meaningfully distinguishable from punishment. A huge, huge, huge case for us!

Another significant decision came in Chatrie v. United States, involving so-called “geofence warrants.” In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in cellphone location data and that law enforcement’s acquisition of broad geofence data constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. The Court rejected the argument that people lose privacy protections merely because a third-party technology company collects their location information. The Court did not completely prohibit geofence warrants (in the event there is suspicion of a crime), but it made clear that constitutional protections apply and that digital location tracking requires meaningful Fourth Amendment scrutiny. In other words, a police officer has to have probable cause that a crime is being committed and can’t just do a fishing expedition (think Highlands County) and merely look and see what they can catch. The case was sent back to lower courts for further proceedings. For registrants, the implications are obvious because of ambiguous proximity ordinances. Did you unknowingly cross the invisible line stepping within 499 feet of a “place where children congregate”? Chatrie reinforces the principle that technological convenience does not eliminate constitutional privacy protections.

There were a couple of indirectly impacting cases that are worth mentioning. In Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton the Court upheld Texas’s online age-verification law for adult-content websites. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion signaled a willingness to allow government regulation of sexual content and age-verification requirements that burden privacy and anonymous access. The Court demonstrated less concern for anonymity and privacy interests when sexual content and child-protection rationales are involved. Think about all the “stings” where people allegedly seek out minors on adult dating sites… The case (and loosening privacy rights in general) is something FAC would never be pleased with, but looking at it from another perspective and all the online platforms registrants can’t be on, there’s suddenly the argument, “why can’t we go on XYZ? we can’t possibly be trolling for minors on there because every user has to verify they are an adult…” This is not so much for future registry litigation, but more so an argument to reenter the digital world.

There was also Esteras v. United States, where the Court held that judges revoking supervised release cannot rely on retribution or punishment considerations; they must focus on the purposes Congress authorized. This only matters if you’re under federal supervised release and can provide arguments against revocation decisions that appear primarily punitive rather than tied to supervision goals of rehabilitation.

So even though no registry case reached the Supreme Court this term, we did get a very strong holding that courts should examine whether a consequence is actually punitive rather than simply accepting legislative labels (Ellingburg). This will revive Ex Post Facto arguments in future litigation. And we don’t have to worry about bored, vindictive or under-quota Sheriff’s detectives arbitrarily getting your cellphone coordinates to see if you stepped within 499 feet of a Chuck E Cheeses. (Chatrie).

Truth be told, the US Supreme Court has not taken on an actual registry challenge in a long, long time, so it’s ripe. They’ve addressed individual elements of registration (Packingham) or the Non-Delegation Doctrine (Gundy) in recent years, but not a full-fledged registration challenge where the court has an opportunity to overturn Smith v. Doe. The closest we came most recently was Does v. Snyder (where the Sixth Circuit held Michigan’s registry had become so punitive that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case, leaving the victory intact, but by refusing to hear it it didn’t overturn Smith v. Doe and become the law of the land. We are hoping that the case we’re working on now will be the vehicle to get us there!

The post The Supreme Court’s 2025–26 Term Has Ended: What Does It Mean for Registry Reform? appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

The plaintiffs argue that forcing them to display this label every time they present identification (whether at a pharmacy, doctor’s office, airport, bank, or workplace) violates the First Amendment by compelling them to convey a government message they do not wish to express. It also subjects them and their families to stigma, distrust, revulsion, poor treatment.

The State attempted to have the case thrown out before it could move forward. The court rejected those arguments, holding that the proper state official can be sued, that the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation, and that the case may proceed. The court also refused to strike the proposed class action allegations, leaving open the possibility that thousands of affected Oklahomans could ultimately benefit from the lawsuit. Importantly, the judge recognized the real-world impact of these branded licenses and accepted as true the plaintiffs’ allegations that the label subjects them to fear, stigma, humiliation, and potential harm whenever they must show identification.

This ruling does not decide whether the law is unconstitutional. But it is an important first step. The case is allowed to proceed, and the plaintiffs will now have the opportunity to prove their case.

Progress is rarely immediate. It happens one case, one ruling, and one courageous plaintiff at a time. This decision is a hopeful reminder that meaningful change remains possible and that the fight for fairness, justice, and equal treatment under the law continues to move forward.

OK Doc 48 Opinion and Order Denying MTD

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During the proceedings, the State acknowledges that employment changes must be reported in person at the sheriff’s office. Under the State’s theory, a registrant in Smith’s position would need to report to work, learn where the company was sending him that day, somehow leave the work assignment, travel to the sheriff’s office to register that temporary job location, and then return to work—all before performing a single hour of labor. They even suggest the work bus drive him to the Sheriff’s office. Like that’s going to happen!

Cases like this force courts to confront an important question: At what point does a registration requirement become an impossible obstacle to ordinary employment?

We are curious to hear how you think Oral Argument went. You can watch it from this link: https://ohiochannel.org/programs/supreme-court-of-ohio-case-no-2025-1215-state-v-smith

The post OH: Watch Ohio Supreme Court Arguments in State v. Smith appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

The case involves a registrant who worked for a cleaning company and was assigned to various job sites as part of his employment. Although he reported his employer, prosecutors argued that a temporary work location constituted a separate “place of employment” that he was required to register. When he failed to do so, he was charged with a felony. The registrant argues that Ohio’s law is unconstitutional because it never clearly defines what a “place of employment” is, leaving people to guess whether the term refers to an employer’s headquarters, a temporary job site, a customer’s property, or somewhere else entirely.

The issues before the Ohio Supreme Court are particularly relevant in Florida, where lawmakers recently expanded employment-reporting requirements under the state’s registry law. While employment reporting may sound straightforward on paper, the reality is far different for many registrants. Because employment opportunities are often limited, many work in industries that involve traveling from location to location throughout the day. They mow lawns, work on construction sites, clean commercial properties, perform maintenance work, flag traffic for road crews, and take other labor-intensive jobs that require them to move between multiple locations.

That raises obvious questions. If a landscaper services ten properties in a single day, is each property a reportable employment location? If a construction worker spends a week at one job site and then moves to another, must the registration be updated every time? If a janitorial employee cleans several businesses each week, are all of those locations considered places of employment? If the answer is yes, compliance quickly becomes an overwhelming burden for people who are simply trying to maintain lawful employment and support themselves.

FAC will be closely following this case.

A copy of the Appellant’s Brief is below:
OH – Employment

The post OH: What Is a “Place of Employment”? Ohio Supreme Court to Hear Major Registry Due Process Case on June 9 appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

The Virginia law made it a felony for certain individuals on the sex offender registry to “loiter” within 100 feet of schools and child day-care facilities. While the legislature chose to criminalize “loitering,” it never defined what that term actually meant. As a result, the court found that ordinary people had no way of knowing when lawful conduct crossed the line into criminal conduct. Was it illegal to stop and tie a shoe? Wait for a ride? Stand on a public sidewalk? Walk slowly through an area? The statute provided no answers.

In dismissing the charges against Richard Cox, the court held that the law violated due process because it failed to provide fair notice of what conduct was prohibited and gave law enforcement officers virtually unlimited discretion to determine who was committing a crime. The court relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in City of Chicago v. Morales, which similarly struck down an anti-loitering ordinance because it left citizens guessing about what behavior was prohibited and encouraged arbitrary enforcement.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the decision was the court’s rejection of the argument that laws targeting registrants should be given special treatment. The Commonwealth argued that the statute applied only to individuals with prior sex offense convictions, but the court emphasized that constitutional safeguards do not disappear simply because a person is unpopular or belongs to a politically disfavored group. The Due Process Clause protects everyone, and legislatures must still draft criminal statutes with sufficient clarity and precision.

The reasoning in Cox is particularly relevant as Florida continues to expand restrictions and criminal penalties imposed on people required to register. While the specific provisions differ, the Virginia decision serves as a reminder that lawmakers cannot simply create broad prohibitions and leave registrants, law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts to figure out what they mean later. Criminal laws must establish clear standards, provide meaningful notice, and avoid granting officers unfettered discretion to decide what conduct is lawful and what conduct is criminal.

The decision also highlights a recurring problem with many registry-related laws. Legislatures often justify sweeping restrictions by invoking public safety, but courts have repeatedly recognized that constitutional rights do not yield simply because a law is directed at registrants. Whether the issue involves residency restrictions, presence restrictions, reporting requirements, internet restrictions, or other criminal prohibitions, the Constitution still requires clear rules and objective standards. A person should not face arrest, prosecution, or imprisonment based on vague language that can mean different things to different officers.

For advocates challenging Florida’s laws, the Virginia ruling provides another example of a court recognizing that constitutional protections remain fully applicable in the registry context. The decision reinforces the argument that laws affecting registrants must be carefully drafted, narrowly tailored, and sufficiently clear so that ordinary people can understand what is required of them. Courts may disagree on the ultimate outcome of particular challenges, but Cox stands as a powerful reminder that due process does not become optional simply because the government is regulating a politically unpopular class of citizens.

As litigation challenging Florida’s new law moves forward, the Virginia decision offers an encouraging signal that some Judges remain willing to scrutinize registry-related restrictions and enforce the constitutional limits that protect all Americans. Public safety is an important governmental interest, but it cannot come at the expense of the fundamental constitutional requirement that criminal laws be clear, understandable, and fairly enforced.

VA – Loitering

The post VA: Virginia Court Rejects Vague Loitering Law appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

Gary Shaver was convicted of sex offenses as a juvenile in 2004. At that time, Michigan’s sex offender registration law (SORA) required him to report address changes within 10 days. Years later, Michigan significantly expanded SORA in 2011. The new law imposed much stricter requirements, including requiring address changes to be reported within three business days and making more information publicly available.

In 2015, Shaver updated his registration to reflect a planned move, but the move fell through. As a result, his registered address was inaccurate for 19 days. He was convicted of violating the 2011 version of SORA and eventually received a lengthy prison sentence after a probation violation.

In 2021, the Michigan Supreme Court decided People v. Betts, holding that the 2011 version of SORA was so punitive that applying it to people whose offenses occurred before 2011 violated the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto punishment. In other words, the state could not retroactively impose those harsher registration requirements on people convicted before the law changed.

After Betts was decided, Shaver asked the courts to throw out his 2015 conviction because it was based on the unconstitutional 2011 SORA requirements.

The key issue was: Does the Betts decision apply retroactively to people whose convictions were already final before Betts was decided? If yes, Shaver’s conviction could be vacated. If no, his conviction would stand.

The Court unanimously ruled that Betts does apply retroactively! The Court reasoned that Betts announced a substantive constitutional rule, not merely a procedural one. The Court explained that Betts effectively prohibited a category of punishment — criminal enforcement of the 2011 SORA requirements — against a class of people whose underlying sex offense convictions occurred before the 2011 amendments.

The result is, people like Shaver can challenge convictions based on those unconstitutional requirements.

Now before someone asks in the comments… NO, this decision is not binding on Florida. This decision potentially affects many people convicted of violating Michigan’s 2011 SORA requirements when their underlying sex offense convictions occurred before 2011. However, this case is persuasive when it comes to arguing similar issues here in Florida.

Read more: https://www.courts.michigan.gov/49c28e/siteassets/case-documents/uploads/opinions/final/sct/167736_76_01.pdf

The post MI: Great Decision: Defendants Convicted of 2011 Registry Amendments May Be Entitled to Relief! appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

This is a great culmination of a long fought battle that went to the 8th Circuit and back. While it’s precedential value does not reach Florida, it is certainly persuasive and in-line with other decisions across other federal Circuits.

You can read the decision here:
Missouri – Halloween Sign

The post MO: A win in Missouri – No More Halloween Signs! appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).

The central legal issue was Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, the law that generally shields internet platforms from liability for content posted by users. The plaintiffs argued that Section 230 should not protect platforms when they knowingly host or distribute child sexual abuse material or benefit from sex trafficking activity.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled mostly in favor of X, holding that Section 230 barred most of the claims because decisions about whether and when to remove third-party content are considered “publishing activities” protected under the law. The court also held that merely failing to remove illegal content quickly enough was not enough to show the platform itself violated federal trafficking laws.

The plaintiffs then asked the Supreme Court of the United States to hear the case, arguing that tech companies should not receive immunity when they knowingly allow child exploitation material to remain online. Yesterday, however, the Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal, leaving the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in place.

The post SCOTUS Refuses to Take up Case Asking Whether X Can Be Sued Over Child Exploitation Videos appeared first on Florida Action Committee (FAC).