The Supreme Court’s 2025–26 Term Has Ended: What Does It Mean for Registry Reform?

The U.S. Supreme Court concluded its 2025–26 term this week. While the Court did not directly decide a sex offender registration case, a few decisions from this term could have significant implications for future challenges to registry laws, supervision conditions, and government surveillance.

For those following registry reform litigation, the most important development may have been the Court’s willingness to look beyond legislative labels and examine the real-world effects of laws and sanctions. That theme appeared repeatedly throughout the term and could eventually influence how courts evaluate modern sex offender registration schemes. The most significant case for registry reform advocates was undoubtedly Ellingburg v. United States. It represents a turning point for registry challenges, where courts have relied on old-generation registry schemes to pile on the “not-punishments”. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court rejected arguments that restitution should be treated as merely remedial or civil (because that’s how they are labeled) and instead focused on its punitive nature.

For decades, courts have relied on Smith v. Doe to uphold retroactive sex offender registration laws by characterizing them as “civil” rather than punitive. Ellingburg suggests courts should look beyond labels and examine whether a consequence functions as punishment in reality. Justice Thomas’s concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, has generated particular interest because it reflects a broader historical approach to determining what constitutes punishment. Although Ellingburg did not overrule Smith v. Doe (even though it called out that case critically several times), it has already sparked strategy among attorneys and advocates about whether modern registration schemes—many of which now include extensive reporting requirements, residency restrictions, internet restrictions, travel restrictions, and public dissemination — remain meaningfully distinguishable from punishment. A huge, huge, huge case for us!

Another significant decision came in Chatrie v. United States, involving so-called “geofence warrants.” In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in cellphone location data and that law enforcement’s acquisition of broad geofence data constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. The Court rejected the argument that people lose privacy protections merely because a third-party technology company collects their location information. The Court did not completely prohibit geofence warrants (in the event there is suspicion of a crime), but it made clear that constitutional protections apply and that digital location tracking requires meaningful Fourth Amendment scrutiny. In other words, a police officer has to have probable cause that a crime is being committed and can’t just do a fishing expedition (think Highlands County) and merely look and see what they can catch. The case was sent back to lower courts for further proceedings. For registrants, the implications are obvious because of ambiguous proximity ordinances. Did you unknowingly cross the invisible line stepping within 499 feet of a “place where children congregate”? Chatrie reinforces the principle that technological convenience does not eliminate constitutional privacy protections.

There were a couple of indirectly impacting cases that are worth mentioning. In Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton the Court upheld Texas’s online age-verification law for adult-content websites. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion signaled a willingness to allow government regulation of sexual content and age-verification requirements that burden privacy and anonymous access. The Court demonstrated less concern for anonymity and privacy interests when sexual content and child-protection rationales are involved. Think about all the “stings” where people allegedly seek out minors on adult dating sites… The case (and loosening privacy rights in general) is something FAC would never be pleased with, but looking at it from another perspective and all the online platforms registrants can’t be on, there’s suddenly the argument, “why can’t we go on XYZ? we can’t possibly be trolling for minors on there because every user has to verify they are an adult…” This is not so much for future registry litigation, but more so an argument to reenter the digital world.

There was also Esteras v. United States, where the Court held that judges revoking supervised release cannot rely on retribution or punishment considerations; they must focus on the purposes Congress authorized. This only matters if you’re under federal supervised release and can provide arguments against revocation decisions that appear primarily punitive rather than tied to supervision goals of rehabilitation.

So even though no registry case reached the Supreme Court this term, we did get a very strong holding that courts should examine whether a consequence is actually punitive rather than simply accepting legislative labels (Ellingburg). This will revive Ex Post Facto arguments in future litigation. And we don’t have to worry about bored, vindictive or under-quota Sheriff’s detectives arbitrarily getting your cellphone coordinates to see if you stepped within 499 feet of a Chuck E Cheeses. (Chatrie).

Truth be told, the US Supreme Court has not taken on an actual registry challenge in a long, long time, so it’s ripe. They’ve addressed individual elements of registration (Packingham) or the Non-Delegation Doctrine (Gundy) in recent years, but not a full-fledged registration challenge where the court has an opportunity to overturn Smith v. Doe. The closest we came most recently was Does v. Snyder (where the Sixth Circuit held Michigan’s registry had become so punitive that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case, leaving the victory intact, but by refusing to hear it it didn’t overturn Smith v. Doe and become the law of the land. We are hoping that the case we’re working on now will be the vehicle to get us there!