A Supreme Court Warning About Categorical Dangerousness
The Supreme Court issued an interesting decision earlier today in United States v. Hemani. Before anyone gets excited, the case is about the Second Amendment — not sex offender registration laws. But some of the Court’s reasoning may sound familiar to anyone who follows registry issues and the arguments can be useful.
The government argued that because Mr. Hemani used marijuana a few times a week, he could automatically be prohibited from possessing a firearm, even though there was no evidence he had ever misused a gun or posed a danger to anyone (famously, Hunter Biden was charged under this law also). The Court rejected that argument, warning against giving the government the “broad power to designate any group as dangerous” and then strip away constitutional rights based solely on that label.
The Court repeatedly emphasized the lack of individualized evidence of dangerousness. As Justice Gorsuch noted, the government wanted to impose severe consequences based on a categorical assumption that members of a particular group are dangerous, without showing that the individual before the court actually posed a threat. That should sound familiar.
For decades, sex offender registry laws have operated on a similar premise — that people convicted of sexual offenses remain dangerous for life. As a result, many individuals are subjected to lifetime registration, residency restrictions, travel restrictions, public shaming, and countless other collateral consequences regardless of their age, health, rehabilitation, or decades of law-abiding behavior.
The problem is that the science does not support the idea that risk remains static forever. In the landmark study High-Risk Sex Offenders May Not Be High Risk Forever, researchers Karl Hanson, Andrew Harris, Leslie Helmus, and David Thornton found that sexual recidivism risk declines significantly the longer a person remains offense-free in the community. Even individuals initially classified as “high risk” saw their risk drop dramatically over time and after 15-20 years, even those originally deemed high risk were no more likely to commit a sex offense than someone who never committed one.
That doesn’t mean Hemani invalidates registry laws. It doesn’t. The case deals with a different constitutional right and a different legal framework. But the Court’s skepticism toward blanket assumptions of permanent dangerousness is noteworthy. When government policies continue to impose lifelong restrictions on entire classes of people based on outdated assumptions rather than individualized evidence, courts may eventually be forced to confront the same question raised in Hemani: At what point does a presumption of dangerousness become disconnected from reality?
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The Experiment
Written by Quiet too long 06/18/2026
Of course, everything is safe and good. As long as lawmakers continue expanding civil labels, redefining punishment as regulation, and categorizing entire groups as permanently dangerous, the world will surely become a better place. After all, nothing strengthens a constitutional republic like treating the Bill of Rights as a flexible experiment — one where rights shrink whenever the government invokes public safety, corruption and revenge These cases demonstrate the government’s admirable commitment to bypassing due process, avoiding individualized evidence, and ensuring that lifelong restrictions can be imposed without the burdens of criminal procedure with civil laws. Truly, as long as this pattern continues, we can all rest easy knowing that constitutional protections have no meaning and are optional and will be suspended whenever convenient.
These are the cases that, if someone were to pretend the erosion of rights is “great” they would cite as examples of the government’s “crimes” in expanding civil power with criminal penalties and demolishing constitutional protections against anyone it concludes to dislike.
SECOND AMENDMENT / DANGEROUSNESS
United States v. Hemani (2024) — Government attempts to define entire groups as dangerous without evidence.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022) — Government tries to maintain discretionary licensing based on vague “dangerousness.”
United States v. Rahimi (2024) — Government pushes categorical bans without individualized findings.
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION & CIVIL DISABILITIES
Smith v. Doe (2003) — Government successfully labels lifelong punishment as “civil.”
Connecticut DPS v. Doe (2003) — Government avoids individualized risk assessments entirely.
Packingham v. North Carolina (2017) — Government attempts to ban internet access for an entire class.
Snyder v. Doe (6th Cir. 2016) — Government expands registry into a punitive system.
Millard v. Rankin (D. Colo. 2017) — Government imposes lifelong public shaming.
Does v. Kentucky (Ky. 2023) — Government maintains retroactive restrictions.
DUE PROCESS / ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Gundy v. United States (2019) — Government seeks broad delegation to define criminal obligations.
Sessions v. Dimaya (2018) — Government uses vague “dangerousness” categories.
Johnson v. United States (2015) — Government relies on undefined violent‑felony labels.
CIVIL PUNISHMENT DISGUISED AS REGULATION
Timbs v. Indiana (2019) — Government uses civil forfeiture as punishment.
Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) — Government creates “civil commitment” as a second sentence.
Grady v. North Carolina (2015) — Government uses GPS monitoring as a civil measure.
STATUS‑BASED RESTRICTIONS
Romer v. Evans (1996) — Government attempts to impose disabilities on a disfavored class.
City of Chicago v. Morales (1999) — Government uses vague loitering laws to target labeled groups.
HISTORICAL TRADITION & RIGHTS LIMITATION
McDonald v. Chicago (2010) — Government attempts selective application of rights.
Boumediene v. Bush (2008) — Government denies habeas rights to detainees labeled dangerous.
Here’s the opposite framing — the one that exposes the absurdity of the system by pretending these cases “usually don’t help” because they get in the way of the government’s preferred approach:
And of course, if someone wanted to see the opposite — the idea that rights should be flexible, that civil labels should override due process, and that entire groups can be restricted forever without individualized evidence — then these cases would be terribly inconvenient. They insist on things like clarity, evidence, proportionality, and constitutional limits. They interrupt the smooth operation of fear‑based policymaking. They remind lawmakers that the Bill of Rights is not optional. And for that reason, they usually don’t support the project of expanding civil punishment. They support the opposite: actual constitutional governance.
THE CASES THAT HELP FIGHT against a corrupt system
These are the cases that push against the systemwide drift toward civil punishment, categorical labels, and constitutional shortcuts.
These cases reject the idea that the government can bypass rights by calling something “regulatory.”
These cases say: you can’t strip rights from whole groups without individualized evidence.
United States v. Hemani (2024)
Rejects “dangerousness by label” for marijuana users.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022)
Rejects vague discretionary licensing based on “public safety.”
Sessions v. Dimaya (2018)
Strikes down vague “dangerousness” categories.
Johnson v. United States (2015)
Invalidates vague violent‑felony definitions used to enhance punishment.
These cases help dismantle the “civil label” loophole.
Ellingburg v. United States (2024)
Holds that courts must evaluate effects, not labels; civil schemes that function as punishment trigger constitutional protections.
Snyder v. Doe (6th Cir. 2016)
Holds Michigan’s registry punitive and unconstitutional.
Millard v. Rankin (D. Colo. 2017)
Finds Colorado’s registry punitive as applied.
Does v. Kentucky (Ky. 2023)
Recognizes punitive effects of retroactive restrictions.
Grady v. North Carolina (2015)
GPS monitoring is a Fourth Amendment search.
Timbs v. Indiana (2019)
Civil forfeiture cannot be used as disguised punishment.
These cases say: the government cannot impose lifelong consequences without real process.
Gundy v. United States (2019) – Gorsuch dissent
Warns against unchecked administrative power.
Boumediene v. Bush (2008)
Even detainees labeled dangerous retain habeas rights.
Morales v. Chicago (1999)
Strikes down vague loitering laws targeting labeled groups.
These cases say: rights don’t disappear because a group is unpopular.
Packingham v. North Carolina (2017)
Strikes down internet bans for registrants.
Romer v. Evans (1996)
Government cannot impose disabilities on a class based on animus.
McDonald v. Chicago (2010)
Rights cannot be selectively applied to disfavored groups.
These cases support the idea that risk changes over time, which destroys the foundation of lifetime restrictions.
Kansas v. Crane (2002)
Requires proof of current dangerousness for civil commitment.
Foucha v. Louisiana (1992)
You cannot detain someone civilly without evidence of present danger.
These cases strike down laws that turn ordinary behavior into a crime based on status or label.
Papachristou v. Jacksonville (1972)
Vagrancy laws void for vagueness; government can’t criminalize existence.
Kolender v. Lawson (1983)
Police can’t demand ID based on vague “credible and reliable” standards.
These cases reject predictive punishment and guilt by future speculation.
United States v. Haymond (2019)
Government cannot impose mandatory prison time based on judge‑found facts in supervised release.
United States v. Comstock (2010)
Although it upheld federal civil commitment, the dissent (Thomas) is directly aligned with your theme: civil labels cannot justify indefinite detention without strict limits.
These cases reinforce your Timbs / Grady / Snyder line.
Austin v. United States (1993)
Civil forfeiture is subject to the Eighth Amendment because it is punitive.
United States v. Ward (1980)
Courts must look at effects, not labels, when determining whether something is punishment.
These cases reinforce your Crane / Foucha line.
Addington v. Texas (1979)
Civil commitment requires clear and convincing evidence.
Mathews v. Eldridge (1976)
Due process requires individualized balancing — no categorical shortcuts.
You already have Romer, but the doctrine is broader.
Lawrence v. Texas (2003)
Government cannot criminalize a class based on moral disapproval.
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)
Government cannot deny fundamental rights to a disfavored group.
These cases reinforce your Boumediene line.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004)
Even in war, citizens retain due process.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006)
Executive cannot create alternative systems to bypass constitutional protections.
You have some, but the foundational ones are missing.
Ex Post Facto Clause cases
• Calder v. Bull (1798)
• Weaver v. Graham (1981)
• Lynce v. Mathis (1997)
in plain language:
Once the government decides you’re outside the circle of constitutional protection, everything changes. And Bias is all that remains even in defense. Period.
The US attorney general states that we are ‘irrebuttably dangerous’.
Shouldn’t he have to prove this since the burden of proof is on the accuser?
Which Attorney General said this and when? Where is this published? I did several Google searches that yielded no results. Please advise because it’s important for a current project I’m working on. Thanks!
@Curious
I am trying to locate it again and so far have found no results but I know that I saw it.
It may have been removed for fear of a lawsuit.
Even AI brought it up once when I searched it but maybe I am not using the exact wording.
It may be ‘irrefutably dangerous’.
It may have been when the 2018 sorna revision came where it was said that the new revision was ‘ a floor and not a ceiling’, or maybe the 2022.
@Curious
A sheriff in the latest post here said ‘we can’t be cured’.
F.A.C
Maybe you could use that as evidence in any major appeal or lawsuit that might be filed with F.A.C and other groups. Like you said, they did not mention us, but the structure of what was said, speaks volumes and does not state we are excluded. So, unless there was clarification, this could be a basis of a future appeal.
But yeah, not getting too excited over it. Slip up in foresight perhaps by the judge? That was to me, a broad statement left open to interpretation and clarification. (But that could also make it worse)
Doesn’t this create an argument of precedent or stare decisis?
I don’t understand the question. This was a matter of first impression by the SCOTUS, so for identical cases that come after it, it would be precedent.
As this may, or may not have any effect in regards to the registry. It should have some effect, in regards to our right to possess a firearm. After all, we see the news in regards to attacks on us. Shouldn’t we have the right to defend ourselves? We aren’t murderers!
This has no bearing on our right to possess a firearm. The opinion distinguished felony convictions right in the opinion.
that is an AWESOME ruling. I am scheduled to fight the level rating I was given in my state (I now live in Arkansas) and this could go a long way when it inevitably reaches a court case. This is why I keep my membership with FAC even though I moved out of state in 2020. Many thanks!
Kevin
Thank you for your continued support. Even if I ever get removed from the registry, I would still love to keep coming on FAC’s site to support others with hope, encouragement and justice.