The Illinois Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois sex offender registration scheme. It has also ruled that sex offender residence restrictions are not facially unconstitutional but remanded an “as applied” challenge to the lower court. The plaintiff had been representing himself pro se.

 

On the question of residence restrictions, the plaintiff cited recidivism studies, as well as studies demonstrating that residence restrictions are ineffective at protecting the community and in fact potentially harmful. The court suggested, however, that these studies were not material to the residence restriction’s constitutionality. That is because the court was unconvinced that the plaintiff had proven that residence restrictions infringe upon a fundamental right. Residence restrictions do not, for example, prohibit a registrant from “living with his family in a residence consistent with the statute,” nor the registrant’s “right to intrastate travel.”

 

And because they were not proven to infringe upon a fundamental right, residence restrictions, in the court’s view, needed only to pass the “rational basis” test to be constitutional. So even if residence restrictions may be ineffective, they are not irrational, because “it is reasonably conceivable [italics added] that preventing child sex offenders from residing within 500 feet of a home day care where children gather will protect children. By distancing child sex offenders from areas where children are present, the legislature rationally sought to avoid giving child sex offenders the opportunity to reoffend.” And the residence restriction is not proven to be punishment because it “does not resemble the historical punishment of banishment, does not resemble imprisonment, is not intended as retribution, bears a reasonable relationship to the rational nonpunitive purpose of keeping children safe from child predators, promotes a reasonable method of accomplishing that goal, and is not excessive to its purpose.”

 

Regarding both residence restrictions and the state’s overall registry scheme, “plaintiff alleged that, since his 2003 conviction, he had not reoffended and had no other criminal charges or convictions. Plaintiff alleged that he had been rehabilitated with no violations and did not possess any recidivist characteristics. Plaintiff thus argues that he has lived a lawful life for the last two decades and has long passed what is known as the ‘desistance threshold,’ where a convicted person’s risk is at the same level as the general population. Plaintiff argues that recidivism rates drop steeply for individuals in their fifties and sixties so that longer periods of registration and community control are inefficient and make it difficult for the public to determine the true risk an individual offender may pose…plaintiff argues that, because he is no longer a risk to the public, the sex offender registration, notification, presence, and residency provisions violate his right to procedural due process and that any post-offense  amendments to these provisions violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.”

 

But the court was not convinced that the registry scheme violated procedural due process or ex post facto. Regarding procedural due process, “Plaintiff’s dangerousness or likelihood to  reoffend is irrelevant to his subjection to these provisions, which are triggered based on his conviction [alone]. Accordingly, plaintiff does not have a due process right to a hearing to establish a fact that is not relevant or material under Illinois law…Plaintiff suggests that the provisions at issue may be overinclusive, imposing burdens on sex offenders like himself who  pose no threat to the public because they will not reoffend. However,… the threat of sex offender recidivism is not a question for rational basis review; that is a question for the legislature.”

 

Regarding ex post facto punishment, the court observed that the state’s registration scheme, i place at the time of plaintiff’s offense, was already found to be non-punitive by precedent and therefore was not ex post facto punishment. And the court was unconvinced that subsequent amendments could constitute punishment if the overall scheme was not. Under the precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, “we must examine whether the scheme is so punitive in purpose or effect that the State’s intention to deem it civil is negated.” The court concluded, “the statutory scheme involving sex offenders and child sex offenders has a nonpunitive purpose of public safety, which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community and creating a buffer between sex offenders and congregations of children.”

 

These are highlights from the court’s full opinion, which may be found here.

 

Several state supreme courts have ruled their state registration schemes to be punitive. Several others have ruled the opposite. The Illinois Supreme Court, with this disappointing ruling, joins the latter club.

 

This case shows why it is important to not only hire an attorney but to hire the right attorney to argue on your behalf, because you never know what sort of precedent you may be establishing for those similarly-situated.

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